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THE CASE FOR ISOLATIONISM


	Just before World War II, many Americans, mostly on the political
right, advocated that the United States stay out of the affairs of the
rest of the world and rely for its defense on its own strength.  The motives
for this were various, traditional, suspicion of foreigners, and also, in
some cases, sympathy with the Fascist regimes that the other side wanted
to prepare to fight.  The other side argued that Fascism was a menace and
the sooner we prepared to stop it the better.  Since we eventually had to
enter the War under conditions of direct attack, the isolationist argument
was considered refuted by almost all Americans.  After World War II, most
people considered that we had learned our lesson, and when they became
convinced that Communism was also a menace, supported the policy of having
the United States organize and lead a coalition against Communism.

	The alliance organized by the United States was duly formed.  Under
its banner, the United States helped rehabilitate Western Europe and Japan,
and this rehabilitation was successful.  When the Korean War occurred, the
allies helped the United States fight it.  The allied contribution was small,
but this was excused on the grounds that the European countries were still
recovering from World War II.  When the Vietnnam War heated up in 1965, the
European countries did not contribute at all although their recovery was
now complete and they were very prosperous.  Why was this?

	The reasons seem to be about as follows:

	1. The American political leaders were quite aroused about what they
believed was a major menace in Vietnam that would lead to more trouble if
not dealt with.

	2. Some of the European leaders sympathized with the United States,
but they did not regard the menace as acute to them especially as the
United States was dealing with it.  Moreover, a large part of their public
opinion didn't believe in the menace at all.  They would have had a major
political fight on their hands to contribute even token forces and the
United States didn't press them.  Perhaps Johnson felt that the forces would
be token in any case and that without them he had a free hand.

	3. As the Vietnam War dragged on, it became increasingly unpleasant
to American middle class youth, and became increasingly unpopular with
intellectuals, with Congress and with Europeans.  The view became widespread
in all these circles that after all, the United States was the villain, and
there was no Communist menace that justified the military action and the
killing they caused.

	4. The European leaders came into an increasingly anomolous position.
On the one hand, the American Vietnam position became more and more unpopular,
and it would obviously be politically foolhardy to defend it or, worse yet,
advocate any direct European military assistance.  On the other hand, their
fear of the Soviet Union has not entirely disappeared.  It was revived by
the occupation of Czechoslovakia and by the evidence that the Soviet Union
was not moving in the direction of internal democracy, by its willingness
to support military adventures in the Middle East and wherever else a
safe opportunity arose under the slogan of supporting wars of national liberation.
From this point of view, it is quite important for them to keep the 300,000
American troops in Europe.

	5. Fortunately, for the political peace of mind of the European
leaders, the United States has not pressed the issue.  Even McGovern
supported keeping the troops in Western Europe, and Nixon proposes
removing them only as part of a general settlement with the Russians.

	6. All this puts the United States in a strange political position
that is becoming increasingly untenable.  Namely, the United States considers
itself the leader of a defensive alliance against Communism, the other members
of which do ever less to sustain the alliance and increasingly criticize
what the U.S. does.  This is especially odd, because of all the countries of
the world, the U.S. is the least threatened by the menace for reasons of
geography, the political attituded of its population, and its economic,
technological, and military strength.  Politically, however, the United
States is becoming weaker and weaker both at home and abroad.

	7. Before discussing what might be done, it is necessary to evaluate
the alleged menace itself.  Is Communism a menace to the freedom of the
rest of the world?  To a certain extent, the answer is a clear yes.
Communist countries are ruled by the politbureaus of their Communist parties
which control information as completely as they can, allow no political
opposition, and interpret all political events in self-righteous terms
that could easily justify any external aggressive action as defensive or
as an act of liberation of the people of the country attacked.  Any change
in this political situation seems unlikely as long as the present generation
of leaders live and problematical after that.  On the other hand, the
Communist countries have engaged in external military action under very
limited circumstances and have mainly confined themselves to giving military
equipment to foreign governments and movements that seemed to advance
their objectives.  Their total external military activity since World
War II has definitely been less than that of the United States.  Of course,
the reason for this might be that a more directly aggressive policy has
been averted only by the activities of the anti-Communist alliance lead
by the United States.

	8. I contend that no-one really knows whether there is a real
Communist military menace - not even the Communists.  Even if one had
a tape recording of all the meetings of the politbureaus of the Soviet
and Chinese Communist Parties and also a tape of the meetings of their
General Staffs, one would still be in doubt.  In order to illustrate
this point, consider the statement made by Lin Piao in 1965 when he was
at the height of his power.  In this statement, he compared the villages
of China to the underdeveloped countries of the world and the cities of
China to the industrialized countries of Europe and North America.  He
said that just as the Chinese Communists organized the villages first
and then surrounded and captured the cities, so the people would win
first in the underdeveloped countries and then take power in Europe
and America.  One may also cite the slogan of Che Guevara advocating
"two, three, many Vietnams".  Consider that Lin Piao had never been
out of China in his life, consider that the statement was based on a
Communist ideology that is extremely prone to wishful thinking both
in general and about particular situations, and consider what happened
to Lin Piao.  If he couldn't predict what was going to happen in China,
how can we put much credence in what he said about the world as a whole
except as an expression of what he hoped would happen and what he would
support if there were a sufficiently attractive opportunity.  Guevara
is also no longer with us and his Latin American Vietnams didn't
materialize.  

	On the other hand, just because Lin Piao and Guevara couldn't
predict the future, it doesn't follow that anyone else can either.

	9. The main point of this essay is that the United States
should get out of its untenable political position even at the possible
cost of more military trouble later.  To put the matter in terms
of slogans, consider that early in the Vietnam war the Hawks raised the
slogan, "Wouldn't you rather fight them in Vietnam than in Hawaii?"
I would raise the counter-slogan, "Much better in Hawaii, if it came
to fighting in Hawaii, we would really know we had to fight, and we
would do it much better."

	Actually, the slogan doesn't really quite describe the possible
eventualities or the policy I advocate. I advocate that the United States
adopt a deliberate policy of doing less than the countries directly
menaced.  If they are really menaced and if they are doing all they
can, we  will help them if they need it.  However, we will not be the
first to organize unless the threat is directly against us.  In particular,
we should withdraw our troops from Western Europe.  If it can be done
as part of a deal with the Russians, fine.  Otherwise, we should withdraw
unilaterally and not come back except in case of dire necessity and under
conditions to total European effort.  Only this will force them to maintain
their own political defenses and prevent them from subordinating their
defense problem to other political considerations like their mutual rivalry.

	Admittedly, this policy has disadvantages.  One or more countries
might have to be lost to Communism before the menace is realized.  If
we had to fight, the terrain might be worse and we might have to do
without advanced bases so the fighting might be harder.  There are also
some risks of nuclear war that might not exist under the present policy.

	However, the advantages outweigh them.  First, we might not
have to fight at all.  It is quite possible that the Communist will not
attempt military adventures and that local Communist will not be able
to overthrow governments.  It is also possible, that a less active
military policy on the part of the United States will contribute to
Communist mellowing and political liberalization when the present leaders
pass on.  On the other hand, if a menace does develop, we and the menaced
will be able to fight it whole-heartedly.  The major reason, though, is
that the present policy is politically untenable, because too many people
all over the world are coming to regard us as the menace because of
propaganda and because of our greater military activity than the major
Communist countries.  I do not see how this political trend can be reversed
as long as we are militarily more active than they.  In fact, there is
a danger, not large as yet, that they might be able to enlist countries
we are trying to defend into a crusade against us.

	These arguments do not say in themselves what to do about Vietnam.
The doctrine would certainly not allow getting into the situation we were
in in 1966-1968 when we were doing most of the fighting and the South
Vietnamese were mostly watching, but now that the South Vietnames are
carrying the burden of their own defense, the doctrine would allow us to
help them.  It does require, however, that we reduce our effort to the
qualitative level that the Communist powers  are giving to the other side.
Therefore, we should agree to stop our air support and blockade if the
Communist will give back our prisoners and maybe we should stop it anyhow.
I don't think we should stop supplying the South Vietnamese except as
part of a mutual agreement with the Russians and Chinese.  Of course,
it may be possible to secure an actual peace there if both sides are
tired enough of fighting.